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Abstract
We study the migrants’ assimilation, which we conceptualize as forming human
capital productive on the labor market of a developed host country, and we link
the observed frequent lack of assimilation with the relative deprivation that the
migrants start to feel when they move in social space towards the natives. In
turn, we presume that the native population is heterogenous and consists of high-
skill and low-skill workers. The presence of assimilated migrants might shape the
comparison group of the natives, influencing the relative deprivation of the low-skill
workers and, in consequence, the choice to form human capital and become highly
skilled. To analyse this interrelation between assimilation choices of migrants and
skill formation of natives, we construct a coevolutionary model of the open-to-
migration economy. Showing that the economy might end up in a non-assimilation
equilibrium, we discuss welfare consequences of an assimilation policy funded from
tax levied on the native population. We identify conditions under which such costly
policy can bring the migrants to assimilation and at the same time increase the
welfare of the natives, even though the incomes of the former take a beating.
Keywords: Coevolutionary economics, Migrants’ assimilation, Well-being of native inhab-
itants, Relative deprivation
JEL classification: C73, D63, F22, J31, J61
1 Introduction
We define the migrants’ assimilation as forming the human capital (e.g. learning a
language) usable on the labor market of a developed host country, which increases their
productivity and, in turn, earnings.1 Still, much evidence is found that the migrants do
not assimilate much, thus their incomes remain low (see, for example [8, 10, 17, 21]). The
economic literature gives some possible reasons for this - seemingly irrational - lack of
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1In such a constrained definition, we follow [6], who study the assimilation in context of forming
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assimilation.2 We chose to follow here a strand of literature [13, 23, 24] that links the low
assimilation with the relative deprivation that the migrants feel in comparison with the
(richer) natives.
Namely, we start with the presumption that income comparisons matter to the in-
dividuals (be it migrants or natives), and that these are mostly upward comparisons
which lower the well-being. To quantify the effect of this comparisons in the individuals’
preferences, we use the index of relative deprivation.3
Next, following [1] theory of social proximity and group affiliation, we draw a link
between assimilation of migrants and their move in social space toward the natives. This
move increases the importance of natives as a comparison group for a migrant, which
intensifies the strength of income comparisons between her and the (richer) natives. This
intensification in relative deprivation might decrease the benefits from assimilation, even
if the absolute income of the migrant rises in the process.
Still, the papers of [13, 23, 24] treated the behavior and incomes of the counterparts of
the migrants’ comparisons - the natives - as constant and given exogenously. Here we try
to correct for this lacuna by proposing a behavior model that takes into account both sides
of the aforementioned comparisons between migrants and natives. In the chosen approach
we use a system of replicator dynamics to define a coevolutionary game which describes
the interrelated behavior of migrants and natives with respect to choices concerning the
assimilation (for the migrants) and human capital formation (for the natives).4
Specifically, we presume that the factors that affect the migrants’ well-being (payoffs
in the game) are their earnings, relative deprivation, and cost of assimilation. The mi-
grants face a choice between assimilating to the mainstream culture, in which case their
productivity and earnings increase, but they bear then the costs of assimilation and of
intensified comparisons with the natives.
In turn, for the natives the matter of choice is the formation of human capital and
consequently to become either a high-skilled worker or remain low-skilled. The natives’
well-being (payoffs in the game) depend on their earnings, relative deprivation and cost
of human capital formation. To include the positive externality to the productivity of the
economy brought by the presence of high-skilled workers, we assume that the earnings of
natives and assimilating migrants depend positively on the fraction of high-skill workers
in the native population.5
Although in this paper we use a relative deprivation index that assumes upward com-
parisons, and we assume that the earnings of migrants, assimilating or not, remain lower
than those of low-skilled natives, we identify a relative deprivation effect of assimilation
on the well-being of natives that is close to the idea of [22]. Namely, because the measure
of relative deprivation depends on the size of the group that an individual compares her
2For example, [15] finds the low assimilation to be a consequence of migrants living in concentrated
communities. [4] study the role of culture preservation in urban segregation and lack of socioeconomic
integration.
3The measure was proposed by [27] and further axiomatized by [11] and [7]. Vast empirical evidence
supports the significance of relative deprivation in people’s well-being; see, for example, [9, 16, 26].
4Although the coevolutionary approach is sometimes used to model choices on the border of economics
and biology (see, for example, [19]), its application to the subject of international migration is scarce.
A model of coevolution of natives and migrants can be found in [3], where a system of two replicator
dynamics equations was used to describe the formation of nationalistic attitudes among natives and
assimilation of immigrants. However, the model presented in [3] is not fully coevolutionary, as individuals
do not derive payoff from meetings with members of their own population. Moreover, the approach taken
in [3] does not include the relative deprivation effect.
5For evidence on a positive effect of human capital spillovers on overall labor productivity and / or
wages see, for example, [20] and [18]. Still, for simplicity, we include in the model an economy-wide
spillover effect, rather than local effects that are found by the aforementioned studies.
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income with, entry of the assimilating migrants into the social space of a native may
influence her relative deprivation and, in turn, her well-being. Therefore, we consider a
possibility that the host-country government might be interested in shaping the assimi-
lation process by means of an assimilation policy. The policy, funded from a tax on the
earnings of natives, high- and low-skilled alike, is assumed to work to decrease the cost of
assimilation. The main aim of the paper is to analyze how the assimilation policy of the
host country affects the equilibria of the evolutionary game.
Before proceeding, a comment is in order. In the empirical literature there is an on-
going discussion of the influence of low-skill migration on the wages and / or employment
of low-skilled natives, with findings ranging from highly negative (see, for example, [5])
to neutral or even positive ([14]). To keep the coevolutionary model simple, we do not
include directly the effect of appearance of migrants on the earnings of the low-skill na-
tives. However, when discussing the assimilation policy, we show that it is possible that
the well-being of the natives increases even if their earnings are diminished as a result of
collecting tax to fund the policy.
The main results of the analysis are as follows. First, we find that the decisions on
assimilation of migrants and the human capital formation of the natives are interrelated.
Second, the group of migrants can become stuck in the non-effective equilibrium with
no assimilation, if unaffected by government policy. Third, we identify conditions under
which an assimilation policy, funded from tax levied on the natives’ earnings, can bring the
group of migrants to full assimilation and, moreover, increase the well-being of migrants
and natives alike, compared to the no-assimilation outcome.
As a starting point of the analysis, in the next Section we present a simple dynamical
model of natives’ behavior in a closed-to-migration economy that serves as a benchmark
case. In Section 3 we add the migrants into the picture, and we construct a coevolutionary
system of equations describing the assimilation behavior of migrants and skill formation
of natives, and we introduce an assimilation policy. We then conduct stability analysis of
the dynamical system, and we discuss how the assimilation policy affects the equilibria of
the evolutionary game. In Section 4 we analyze the welfare effects of the policy-enhanced
assimilation process. Section 5 concludes.
2 Dynamics of the natives
As a benchmark model, we consider in this Section a closed-to-migration economy.
Let there be a country with continuous population of size N of native inhabitants. The
workforce of the country is heterogenous: a worker can be low-skilled or high-skilled.
The fraction of high-skill natives is denoted by q (the fraction of low-skill natives is then
1− q). Low-skilled workers enjoy a lower level of earnings than high-skilled workers, but
they do not bear costs associated with education. High-skilled workers need to cover a
cost of forming their human capital, but they are earning higher wage and also they bring
a positive externality to the productivity of the economy. To measure this externality,
we assume that the incomes of both high- and low-skilled workers are composed from a
”base salary” and an added factor depending on the fraction of high-skill natives. Namely,
a high-skilled worker’s income, iHS(q), is equal to IHS as a base salary plus q · IE, while
a low-skilled worker’s income, iLS(q), is equal to ILS as a base salary plus q · IE, where
IHS > ILS > 0 and IE > 0 is the parameter measuring the strength of the externality. We
assume that the cost of forming human capital to become a high-skill worker also depends
3
on the fraction of high-skill workers, and amounts to q · cHS, where cHS > 0.
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To introduce social preferences into the model, we assume that the individuals experi-
ence relative deprivation, namely an individual senses dissatisfaction if other individuals
earn more than her. The relative deprivation of an individual is defined by means of
the index of relative deprivation, namely as a fraction of those whose incomes are higher
than her income times their mean excess income. In our case, as low-skill workers have
lower incomes than the high-skilled ones, the former are relatively deprived. The relative
deprivation of a low-skill native is
RDLS(q) := q · [(iHS(q)− iLS(q)]
= q · [(IHS + q · IE)− (ILS + q · IE)]
= q · (IHS − ILS).
Every native individual derives utility from her income. Moreover, high-skill natives
bear the cost of forming human capital, while low-skill natives are concerned about relative
deprivation. Thus the utility of a high-skill native is
uHS(q) := (1− β) · iHS(q)− q · cHS
= (1− β) · (IHS + q · IE)− q · cHS,
(1)
and the utility of a low-skill native has the form
uLS(q) := (1− β) · iLS(q)− β · RDLS(q)
= (1− β) · (ILS + q · IE)− β · q · (IHS − ILS),
(2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) describes the intensity of the concern of an individual about being
relatively deprived, with the complementary weight 1 − β defining the utility brought
from the level of absolute income.
We describe the evolution of the proportion of high-skill natives, q, using the replicator
dynamics equation:
q˙ = q · [uHS(q)− uN (q)] = q · (1− q) · [uHS(q)− uLS(q)], (3)
where uN(q) denotes average utility of natives, that is uN(q) = q · uHS(q) + (1 − q) ·
uLS(q). The replicator dynamics reflects the fact that the fraction of high-skill natives, q,
increases as long as the utility of a high-skill native is higher than the average utility of
the population.
Solving equation (3) for steady states is equivalent to q = 0 or q = 1 or uHS(q) = uLS(q).
The last equation has only one solution given by
q∗ =
(1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
. (4)
The solution q∗ is internal (i.e. q∗ ∈ (0, 1)) if and only if
cHS > IHS − ILS. (5)
If cHS 6 IHS− ILS then the only steady states of the dynamics (3) are q = 0 and q = 1.
In other words in the long run the population of natives consists entirely of low-skill
workers (q = 0) or of high-skill workers (q = 1). To assure that the model of economy is
non-trivial, namely that there exist non-zero fractions of both low- and high-skill natives,
for the analysis that follows we assume that the condition (5) holds.
Stability of the steady states of the equation (3) is summarized below.
6In other words, the larger the share of high-skill workers in the population, the more effort is needed
to be perceived as one.
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Corollary 1. For the dynamics described by equation (3), we have that:
• q = 0 is unstable,
• q = 1 is unstable,
• q = q∗ is asymptotically stable.
The proof of Corollary 1 is in Appendix A.
Thus only q = q∗ forms a stable equilibrium in closed-to-migration economy. In other
words, starting from any level of fraction of high-skill natives such that q0 ∈ (0, 1), the
dynamics tends to q∗ as time approaches infinity.
Example 1. The dynamics of natives for the following values of the parameters:
IHS = 1.0, IE = 0.35 β = 0.5,
ILS = 0.6, cHS = 0.7,
is shown on the graph below. In this case only q∗ = 0.4 is asymptotically stable steady
state.
0 q ∗ 1
 
Figure 1: Phase portrait of dynamics (3).
3 Co-evolution of natives and migrants
In this Section, we introduce a population of migrants to the country of natives. The
population of migrants is continuous and of size M < N . Every migrant has two available
strategies: she may decide to assimilate, that is, learn the language of natives, obtain
tools and skills which increase her productivity at the labor market of the host country,
or she may remain non-assimilating. We denote by p the fraction of assimilating migrants,
with 1− p being the fraction of non-assimilating migrants.
The assimilation defined in such a manner is costly; forming the human capital by a
migrant is connected with cost cA ≥ 0. As we are interested in an institutional response
of the host country to the appearance of the migrants, we introduce a possibility that
the host country implements an assimilation policy, which has a form of an allowance A
aimed at reducing the cost of assimilation, such that cA > A ≥ 0, where A = 0 represents
the case without an assimilation policy. At the same time the natives bear the cost of
this operation, i.e. the income of every native is reduced by p·M ·A
N
= p · m · A, where
m := M
N
< 1. The income of a high-skill native is now iHS(p, q) = IHS + q · IE − p ·m · A,
and the income of a low-skill native iLS(p, q) equals now to ILS + q · IE − p ·m · A.
An assimilating migrant’s income, iA(p, q), is equal to IA as a base salary plus q · IE,
namely she also benefits from the externality provided by the high-skilled natives. A
non-assimilating migrant earns a wage iNA(p, q) = INA (no externality from high-skilled
natives occurs in her case). We assume that the base salary of assimilating migrants is
higher then the income of non-assimilating migrants and at the same time lower then the
base salary of low-skill natives after taxation for every possible levels of assimilation of
migrants, p, and of assimilation allowance A < cA, i.e. ILS −m · cA > IA > INA > 0.
7
7The assumption on migrants’ incomes being lower than those of low-skill natives is, of course, a
simplification, however the Eurostat data show that indeed the migrants’ median income was even 50%
lower than that of nationals in some EU countries, and that almost half of migrant population in EU-28
was at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2016 ([12]).
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3.1 The co-evolutionary system
To analyse the influence of migrants on the group of natives, we presume that, apart
from imposing a possible cost of the assimilation policy, the assimilation of migrants
widens the reference group of natives, namely the natives include the assimilating migrants
in their reference group. Because the earnings of assimilating migrants remain lower than
those of the low-skill workers, the widening of the comparison group decreases the relative
deprivation of the latter, which now amounts to
RDLS(p, q) :=
qN
N + pM
(
iHS(p, q)− iLS(p, q)
)
=
q
1 + p ·m
[(IHS + q · IE − p ·m ·A)− (ILS + q · IE − p ·m · A)]
=
q
1 + p ·m
(IHS − ILS).
The utility of low-skilled native is now thus:
uLS(p, q) = (1− β) · iLS(p, q)− β · RDLS(p, q)
= (1− β) · (ILS + q · IE − p ·m · A)−
β · q
1 + p ·m
(IHS − ILS),
(6)
while, comparing to uHS(q) defined in Section 2, the utility of a high-skilled native is now
affected by the cost of assimilation policy:
uHS(p, q) = (1− β) · iHS(p, q)− q · cHS
= (1− β) · (IHS + q · IE − p ·m · A)− q · cHS.
(7)
Although the low-skill natives benefit from the externality provided by the high-skilled
natives, we assume that the boost in utility caused by this increase in absolute income is
smaller than the negative effect of relative deprivation arising from comparisons with the
high-skilled workers for every possible level of assimilation of migrants, that is
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS) > (1− β) · IE. (8)
From the last inequality and with help of (5) we derive the following chain of inequalities:
cHS >
β
1 +m
cHS >
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS) > (1− β) · IE.
In particular we obtain that
cHS > (1− β) · IE. (9)
The inequality (9) yields that the positive externality to the productivity of the economy
due to the presence of workforce of high-skill natives is not high enough to compensate
for the negative effects on utility of natives brought by the cost of becoming high-skilled.
To analyse the utility of migrants in the social space of natives we assume that, apart
from the change in earnings of assimilating migrants, the assimilation affects the utilities
of migrants in several other dimensions. First, it brings the migrant closer to the natives;
in other words, it is impossible to assimilate in economic dimension and at the same time
remain disconnected from the society of the natives. In consequence, the reference group
of an assimilating migrant consists of the entire population, thus an assimilating migrant
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experiences relative deprivation from comparing her income with those of the (richer)
natives. The relative deprivation of an assimilating migrant equals thus to
RDA(p, q) :=
N
N +M
[
q ·
(
iHS(p, q)− iA(p, q)
)
+ (1− q) ·
(
iLS(p, q)− iA(p, q)
)]
=
1
1 +m
[
q ·
(
(IHS + q · IE − p ·m · A)− (IA + q · IE)
)
+ (1− q) ·
(
(ILS + q · IE − p ·m · A)− (IA + q · IE)
)]
=
1
1 +m
·
[
q · (IHS − ILS) + (ILS − IA − p ·m · A)
]
.
A non-assimilating migrant experiences relative deprivation only from comparing with
the assimilating migrants; the natives are not in the reference group of non-assimilating
migrant. The relative deprivation of a non-assimilating migrant amounts to
RDNA(p, q) := p ·
(
iA(p, q)− iNA(p, q)
)
= p ·
(
IA + q · IE − INA
)
.
The utilities of assimilating and non-assimilating migrants amount to, respectively:
uA(p, q) = (1− β) · iA(p, q)− (cA − A)− β · RDA(p, q)
= (1− β) · (IA + q · IE)− (cA −A)
−
β
1 +m
·
[
q · (IHS − ILS) + (ILS − IA − p ·m · A)
]
and
uNA(p, q) = (1− β) · iNA(p, q)− β · RDNA(p, q)
= (1− β) · INA − β · p · (IA + q · IE − INA).
Empirical studies reveal that assimilation increases migrants’ incomes [17, 21, 25].
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that if there was no assimilation cost then all migrants
would assimilate. To this end it is enough to ensure that uA(p, q)∣∣cA=0 > uNA(p, q)∣∣cA=0
(note that if cA = 0 then also A = 0). Observe that the function uA(·) is increasing with
respect to variable p, and that the function uNA(·) is decreasing with respect to variable p.
Thus for the last inequality to hold for every p ∈ [0, 1] it is sufficient to assume that this
inequality holds for p = 0. Moreover, by (8) we have that the function uA(·) is decreasing
with respect to variable q (and variable q is not relevant in uNA(·) if p = 0), thus for the
last inequality to hold for every q ∈ [0, 1] it is sufficient to assume that this inequality
holds for q = 1. Therefore, it is sufficient that uA(0, 1)∣∣cA=0 > uNA(0, 1)∣∣cA=0 holds, which
is equivalent to the following inequality:
(1− β) · (IA + IE − INA) >
β
1 +m
(IHS − IA). (10)
We describe the co-evolution of proportions of high-skill native in native population,
q, and of assimilating migrants in migrant population, p, using a system of replicator
dynamic equations: {
p˙ = p · (1− p) · (uA(p, q)− uNA(p, q)),
q˙ = q · (1− q) · (uHS(p, q)− uLS(p, q)).
(11)
The system (11) represents the presumption that as long as assimilation brings higher
utility that non-assimilation, the proportion of assimilating migrants (p) will increase.
Likewise, a the proportion of natives investing in human capital (q) will grow if the utility
of a high-skill native is higher that that of low-skill native.
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3.2 Stability analysis of the system
The steady states of the system (11) are the solutions of the equations p˙ = 0 and
q˙ = 0. Solving this system of equations can be divided into following 9 cases:
(A)
{
p = 0
q = 0
(B)
{
p = 0
q = 1
(C)
{
p = 1
q = 0
(D)
{
p = 1
q = 1
(E)
{
uA(p, q) = uNA(p, q)
q = 0
(F)
{
uA(p, q) = uNA(p, q)
q = 1
(G)
{
p = 0
uHS(p, q) = uLS(p, q)
(H)
{
p = 1
uHS(p, q) = uLS(p, q)
(I)
{
uA(p, q) = uNA(p, q)
uHS(p, q) = uLS(p, q)
Cases (A)–(D) yield the corners of the square [0, 1]× [0, 1], i.e. the states (0, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 0) and (1, 1), respectively.
The existence of solutions of the equations (E) and (F) within the square [0, 1]× [0, 1]
is dependent on the value of the cost of assimilation:
• The system (E) has exactly one solution (p∗, 0), where
p∗ =
β
1+m
(ILS − IA) + (cA − A)− (1− β) · (IA − INA)
β
(
m
1+m
A+ IA − INA
) ,
such that p∗ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if

cA > A + (1− β) · (IA − INA)−
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA),
cA <
(
1 +
m
1 +m
β
)
· A+ (IA − INA)−
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA).
• The system (F) has exactly one solution (p∗∗, 1), where
p∗∗ =
β
1+m
(IHS − IA) + (cA − A)− (1− β) · (IA + IE − INA)
β
(
m
1+m
A+ IA + IE − INA
) ,
such that p∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) if and only if

cA > A+ (1− β) · (IA + IE − INA)−
β
1 +m
(IHS − IA),
cA <
(
1 +
m
1 +m
β
)
· A+ (IA + IE − INA)−
β
1 +m
(IHS − IA).
The existence of solutions of the equations (G) and (H) within the square [0, 1]× [0, 1]
is ensured by the inequality (5). Case (G) has a solution (0, q∗), where q∗ is given by
(4), namely, it is the equilibrium of the closed-to-migration economy, and case (H) has a
solution (1, q∗∗), where
q∗∗ =
(1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
cHS −
β
1+m
(IHS − ILS)
. (12)
Notice that
q∗ − q∗∗ = q∗ · q∗∗ ·
β
1− β
·
m
1 +m
> 0. (13)
The decrease of the fraction of high-skill workers in the case of the state (1, q∗∗) in com-
parison with the state (0, q∗) is a consequence of the fact that increase of the fraction of
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assimilating migrants decreases the relative deprivation of low-skill natives, thus increases
the utility of this group. As a result, the gain from becoming high-skill native diminishes,
and the equilibrium q shifts down.
The system of equations (I) has two solutions which can be obtained using simple
algebra, however the exact formulas for the solutions are somewhat complicated and do
not provide any useful information, therefore we do not show these formulas in full form.
Still, we will be able to derive some more information regarding the solutions of the system
of equations (I) after we determine how the evolution of the system (11) depends on the
assimilation policy.
Compared to the simple dynamics of natives (cf. (3)), the local stability of the steady
states of the system (11) depends on the interplay between the parameters of the model,
most notably the value of A. However some information on this subject still can be
derived, which is the substance of the following corollary.
Corollary 2. For the dynamical system (11) we have that:
1. the states (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) are all unstable,
2. if p∗ ∈ (0, 1), then the state (p∗, 0) is unstable,
3. if p∗∗ ∈ (0, 1), then the state (p∗∗, 1) is unstable.
The proof of Corollary 2 is in Appendix B.
Therefore, as in the case of the close-to-migration economy, the states of the system
such that q = 0 or q = 1 are unstable. The following claim summarizes the stability of
states derived as solutions to the cases (A)–(H).
Claim 1. Among the states characterized by the cases (A)–(H), only states (0, q∗) and
(1, q∗∗) can be asymptotically stable. Specifically:
• the state (0, q∗) is asymptotically stable if and only if A < A∗, where
A∗ := cA +
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (1− β) · (IA − INA)
+ q∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
,
(14)
• the state (1, q∗∗) is asymptotically stable if and only if A > A∗∗, where
A∗∗ :=
1(
1 + m
1+m
β
) [cA + β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (IA − INA)
+ q∗∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− IE
)]
.
(15)
The proof of Claim 1 is in Appendix C.
Corollary 3. Let A∗ be defined in (14) and A∗∗ be defined in (15). Then
A∗∗ < A∗ < cA.
The proof of Corollary 3 is in Appendix C.
Claim 1 and Corollary 3 provide the main results of this Section, but before we proceed
with describing them, we finalize the stability discussion by characterizing the solutions
to the case that was not discussed as yet, that is (I), in the next lemma and corollary
that follows.
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Lemma 1. The system of equations (I) has at most one solution within the square [0, 1]×
[0, 1]. Moreover, if A > A∗, the system of equations (I) has no solution within the square
[0, 1]× [0, 1].
The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix C.
Corollary 4. If (p, q) denotes a solution of the system of equations (I) such that (p, q) ∈
[0, 1]× [0, 1], then:
1. q∗∗ 6 q 6 q∗ if and only if p ∈ [0, 1],
2. the state (p, q) is unstable.
The proof of Corollary 4 is in Appendix C.
Corollary 4 states that even if there exists a solution to the system (I) that lies inside
the square [0, 1]× [0, 1], it is surely not stable.
Summing up the results pertaining the stability of solutions to the cases (A)–(I) above,
we get that only the states (0, q∗) and (1, q∗∗) are candidates to be asymptotically stable.
More specifically, if A ∈ (A∗∗, A∗) then both states (0, q∗) and (1, q∗∗) are asymptotically
stable. In this case the basins of attraction of (0, q∗) and of (1, q∗∗) divide the square
(0, 1)× (0, 1) into two disjoint subsets. The dependence of the asymptotic stability of the
states (0, q∗) and (1, q∗∗) on the assimilation allowance A is represented diagrammatically
in the following graph.
Only (0, q∗) is 
 asymptotically stable
Both (0, q ∗ ) and (1, q∗ ∗ ) are 
 asymptotically stable
Only (1, q∗ ∗ ) is 
 asymptotically stable
A ∗ ∗ A ∗ A
Figure 2: Asymptotic stability of the states (0, q∗) and (1, q∗∗) depends on the assimilation
allowance.
Basing on Claim 1 and Corollary 3, we can derive three observations for the economy
with migration but without an assimilation policy, which are given in the form of a remark
below.
Remark 1.
1. In case A∗∗ > 0, then if A = 0, the dynamics is moving all initial states (p0, q0) ∈
(0, 1)× (0, 1) towards (0, q∗), i.e. the state where all migrants are non-assimilating.
2. In case A∗∗ < 0 < A∗, then if A = 0, some initial states will move towards (0, q∗),
i.e. the state where all migrants are non-assimilating, and other initial states will
move towards (1, q∗∗), i.e. the state where all migrants are assimilating. However, if
the fraction of assimilating migrants is initially small enough, then the state (p0, q0)
will move towards (0, q∗). This type of dynamics is shown in Example 2 below.
3. If A∗ < 0, then even if A = 0, the dynamics is moving all initial states (p0, q0) ∈
(0, 1)× (0, 1) towards (1, q∗∗), i.e. the state where all migrants are assimilating.
Observe that situation in which A∗ < 0 requires no assimilation policy for the full-
assimilation to be the only asymptotically stable state. However, as such constellation
provides no tension in the assimilation process, from now on we focus on the situation in
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which A∗ > 0. This last inequality can be expressed by means of a condition on the cost
of assimilation: A∗ > 0⇔ cA > cA, where
cA :=(1− β)(IA − INA)−
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)
− q∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
.
(16)
Moreover, note that the factor cA is positive. Indeed, A
∗ = cA − cA and by Corollary 3
we have that A∗ < cA. These two facts imply that cA > 0.
We now provide a numerical solution and a vector field diagram of the system (11) for
a set of chosen values of the parameters.
Example 2. In the graph below we show the dynamics of the the economy with migration
for the following values of the parameters:
IHS = 1.0, IE = 0.35, m = 0.1,
ILS = 0.6, cHS = 0.7, A = 0,
IA = 0.53, cA = 0.2,
INA = 0.3, β = 0.5,
along with trajectories of some initial states. In this case A∗∗ = − 86
1425
≈ −0.0604 < 0 and
A∗ = 263
2200
≈ 0.1195 > 0. Because A∗∗ < A < A∗, we have that both states (0, q∗) = (0, 0.4)
and (1, q∗∗) =
(
1, 22
57
)
are asymptotically stable.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
p
q
Figure 3: Phase portrait of dynamical system (11).
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4 Social welfare of natives
In the previous Section we characterized conditions under which it is possible that
without an assimilation policy the economy will be at risk of ending up in a configuration,
in which all the migrants choose not to assimilate (p = 0). Assuming that such conditions
hold, that is, A∗ > 0 (cf. Remark 1 and discussion that followed), the government might
be interested in introducing the policy in order to prevent such an outcome. Thus, in this
Section we pose the following question: is it possible that the natives will be better off
in an open-to-migration economy in which the assimilation of migrants is triggered by a
(costly) assimilation policy in comparison to closed-to-migration economy? We address
this problem by providing an analysis of the well-being of the natives measured by an
utilitarian social welfare function.
We denote social welfare of natives by SWN(p, q, A), which we define as the sum of
the utilities of natives:
SWN(p, q, A) := q ·N · uHS(p, q) + (1− q) ·N · uLS(p, q)
= N · [q · (uHS(p, q)− uLS(p, q)) + uLS(p, q)] .
(17)
We first note that an equilibrium of the open-to-migration economy (0, q∗) with A =
0 is equivalent in the native social welfare to an equilibrium q∗ in closed-to-migration
economy. To see this clearly, it suffices to compare (1) with (7) and (2) with (6) for p = 0.
Second, recalling Claim 1, the state (0, q∗) is a stable equilibrium as long as A < A∗.
Thus if A > A∗ then by Corollary 3 we know that the state (1, q∗∗) is the only stable
equilibrium in open-to-migration economy. Thus, the minimal level of allowance that
enables full assimilation of migrants is A = A∗.
Therefore, to answer the question posed at the beginning of this Section, we will
compare social welfare of natives in two following equilibria of the economy with migration:
(0, q∗) with A = 0 and (1, q∗∗) with A = A∗. We now state and prove the following claim.
Claim 2. The full assimilation of migrants (enhanced by the assimilation policy) is ben-
eficial to natives, i.e. SWN(1, q
∗∗, A∗) > SWN(0, q
∗, 0), if and only if
cA < cA + q
∗ · q∗∗ ·
β · (cHS − (1− β) · IE)
(1 +m)(1− β)2
, (18)
where cA is defined in (16).
The proof of Claim 2 is in Appendix D.
In Claim 2 we identified a condition on the level of the cost of assimilation, for which
a successful assimilation policy brings a welfare gain to the natives. If this condition
holds, then even if the native population bear the cost of the policy, the overall effect
of a decrease in relative deprivation of low-skill natives, brought about by the move of
migrants in the social space, is enough to compensate for the loss of utility caused by
decrease in absolute income. However, if this condition is not met, then setting in motion
the assimilation policy will be harmful to the well-being of the natives. For example,
reminding the formula for q∗∗ (12), we see that an increase in the fraction of migrants,
m, tightens the cap on cA defined on the right-hand-side of (18). Namely, the more
migrants are present in the economy, the more stringent the condition that determines
the effectiveness of the assimilation policy.
Lastly, we take a look at the migrants’ well-being under the policy. We define social
welfare of migrants, SWM(p, q, A), in a similar fashion as in the case of natives:
SWM(p, q, A) := p ·M · uA(p, q) + (1− p) ·M · uNA(p, q).
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In the following corollary we provide a quite intuitive result, which pertains to the
effect of the assimilation policy on the welfare of the migrants.
Corollary 5. The full assimilation (enhanced by the assimilation policy) is beneficial to
migrants (in comparison to no-assimilation).
The proof of Corollary 5 is in Appendix D.
Corollary 5 shows that if there is a need for an assimilation policy to bring the migrants
to full assimilation (that is, A∗ > 0), such policy is always beneficial to the migrant
population.
In sum, we obtain as the main result of this Section that as long as the condition (18)
holds, then a costly assimilation policy such that A = A∗ is welfare-enhancing for the
whole population of the host country, natives and migrants alike.
5 Conclusions
We have formulated a simple dynamical model of an open-to-migration developed
economy which struggles with the problem of non-assimilation of migrants. Throughout
the paper, we have used a somewhat tailored definition of assimilation, limiting it to the
process of acquiring the human capital specific to the labor market of the host country.
Still, we admit that the process of assimilation in the economic sphere cannot occur
without a parallel move in a social sphere - a move which brings the migrants and natives
together and influences the formation of comparison groups of both.
Next, we studied the interplay between the absolute and relative income effects of
an assimilation policy, which is targeted at bringing all the migrants to the point of
assimilation. We identified conditions under which the policy can increase the welfare of
both the natives and migrants, even though it is funded out of the pockets of the former.
The conditions for such an outcome to occur hinge on what we have defined for the needs
of our model as the migrants’ cost of assimilation, which, in turn, can depend on a mixture
of many social, cultural and economic factors, characterizing both the migrants as well
as the receiving country. In any case, a government pondering an adoption of a costly
assimilation-enhancing policy must understand the intricate channels it might affect the
economy and social fabric.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Proof of Corollary 1. We denote the most right-hand-side of the equation (3) by F (q),
i.e.
F (q) = q · (1− q) · [uHS(q)− uLS(q)]
= q · (1− q) · [(1− β) · (IHS − ILS) + β · q · (IHS − ILS)− q · cHS].
The stability of a steady state r of the equation (3) depends on the sign of F ′(r):
• if F ′(r) > 0 then r is unstable,
• if F ′(r) < 0 then r is asymptotically stable.
The derivative of F has the following form
F ′(q) = (1− q) · [uHS(q)− uLS(q)]− q · [uHS(q)− uLS(q)] + q · (1− q) · [u
′
HS(q)− u
′
LS(q)].
We have that
1. F ′(0) = uHS(0)− uLS(0) = (1− β) · (IHS − ILS) > 0,
2. F ′(1) = −[uHS(1)− uLS(1)] = −[(IHS − ILS)− cHS] > 0,
3. F ′(q∗) = q∗ · (1− q∗) · [u′HS(q
∗)− u′LS(q
∗)] < 0.
The second inequality follows from the condition (5), and the third inequality is a conse-
quence of the following facts: q∗ ∈ (0, 1) and
u′HS(q)− u
′
LS(q) = β · (IHS − ILS)− cHS < 0 ∀q ∈ [0, 1].
Now because q∗ is the only asymptotically stable state in [0, 1], thus the state q∗ is in fact
globally asymptotically stable.
Appendix B
Proof of Corollary 2. We denote the right-hand-sides of the system (11) by f1(p, q)
and f2(p, q) respectively, i.e.
f1(p, q) = p · (1− p) · [uA(p, q)− uNA(p, q)]
= p · (1− p) ·
[
(1− β) · (IA + q · IE − INA) + β · p · (IA + q · IE − INA)
−
β
1 +m
(
q · (IHS − ILS) + (ILS − p ·m · A− IA)
)
− (cA − A)
]
,
f2(p, q) = q · (1− q) · [uHS(p, q)− uLS(p, q)]
= q · (1− q) ·
[
(1− β) · (IHS − ILS) +
β · q
1 + p ·m
(IHS − ILS)− q · cHS
]
.
We additionally denote
h1(p, q) := uA(p, q)− uNA(p, q),
h2(p, q) := uHS(p, q)− uLS(p, q).
Stability of a steady state (r, s) of the equations (11) can be determined by the eigen-
values of the Jacobian matrix of the system (see the Hartman-Grobman theorem [2]).
Namely:
14
• if all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix at the state (r, s) have strictly negative real
parts then (r, s) is asymptotically stable,
• if at least one eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix at the state (r, s) has strictly
positive real part then (r, s) is unstable.
The Jacobian matrix of the system (11) has the following form:
J(p, q) =
[
∂f1
∂p
(p, q) ∂f1
∂q
(p, q)
∂f2
∂p
(p, q) ∂f2
∂q
(p, q)
]
,
where
∂f1
∂p
(p, q) = (1− p) · h1(p, q)− p · h1(p, q) + p · (1− p) ·
∂h1
∂p
(p, q),
∂f1
∂q
(p, q) = p · (1− p) ·
∂h1
∂q
(p, q),
∂f2
∂p
(p, q) = q · (1− q) ·
∂h2
∂p
(p, q),
∂f2
∂q
(p, q) = (1− q) · h2(p, q)− q · h2(p, q) + q · (1− q) ·
∂h2
∂q
(p, q),
and
∂h1
∂p
(p, q) = β · (IA + q · IE − INA) +
m
1 +m
β ·A,
∂h1
∂q
(p, q) = (1− β) · IE + β · p · IE −
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS),
∂h2
∂p
(p, q) = −
(
1
1 + p ·m
)2
· β ·m · q · (IHS − ILS),
∂h2
∂q
(p, q) =
β
1 + p ·m
(IHS − ILS)− cHS.
We denote the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix by e1 and e2. Let us now compute
the eigenvalues in the case of the steady states of the system (11):
State (0, 0)
J(0, 0) =
[
h1(0, 0) 0
0 h2(0, 0)
]
e1 = h1(0, 0) = (1− β) · (IA − INA)−
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (cA − A)
e2 = h2(0, 0) = (1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
Observe that the second eigenvalue is positive, e2 > 0, therefore the state (0, 0) is
unstable.
State (0, 1)
J(0, 1) =
[
h1(0, 1) 0
0 −h2(0, 1)
]
e1 = h1(0, 1) = (1− β) · (IA + IE − INA)−
β
1 +m
(IHS − IA)− (cA − A)
e2 = −h2(0, 1) = cHS − (IHS − ILS)
Observe that the second eigenvalue is positive due to inequality (5), e2 > 0, therefore
the state (0, 1) is unstable.
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State (1, 0)
J(1, 0) =
[
−h1(1, 0) 0
0 h2(1, 0)
]
e1 = −h1(1, 0) =
β
1 +m
(ILS −m · A− IA) + (cA − A)− (IA − INA)
e2 = h2(1, 0) = (1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
Observe that the second eigenvalue is positive, e2 > 0, therefore the state (1, 0) is
unstable.
State (1, 1)
J(1, 1) =
[
−h1(1, 1) 0
0 −h2(1, 1)
]
e1 = −h1(1, 1) =
β
1 +m
(IHS −m · A− IA) + (cA −A)− (IA + IE − INA)
e2 = −h2(1, 1) = cHS −
(
1− β +
β
1 +m
)
· (IHS − ILS)
Because 1 − β + β
1+m
< 1 the second eigenvalue is positive due to inequality (5),
e2 > 0. Therefore the state (1, 1) is unstable.
State (p∗, 0)
J(p∗, 0) =
[
∂f1
∂p
(p∗, 0) ∂f1
∂q
(p∗, 0)
0 h2(p
∗, 0)
]
e1 =
∂f1
∂p
(p∗, 0) = (1− p∗) · h1(p
∗, 0)− p∗ · h1(p
∗, 0) + p∗ · (1− p∗) ·
∂h1
∂p
(p∗, 0)
= p∗ · (1− p∗) ·
(
β · (IA − INA) +
m
1 +m
β · A
)
e2 = h2(p
∗, 0) = (1− β)(IHS − ILS)
(In the computations above it is worth to notice that h1(p
∗, 0) = 0.)
Observe that both eigenvalues are positive, thus the state (p∗, 0) is unstable.
State (p∗∗, 1)
J(p∗∗, 0) =
[
∂f1
∂p
(p∗∗, 1) ∂f1
∂q
(p∗∗, 1)
0 −h2(p
∗∗, 1)
]
e1 =
∂f1
∂p
(p∗∗, 1) = (1− p∗∗) · h1(p
∗∗, 1)− p∗∗ · h1(p
∗∗, 1) + p∗∗ · (1− p∗∗) ·
∂h1
∂p
(p∗∗, 1)
= p∗∗ · (1− p∗∗) ·
(
β · (IA + IE − INA) +
m
1 +m
β · A
)
e2 = −h2(p
∗∗, 1) = cHS −
(
1− β +
β
1 + p∗∗ ·m
)
(IHS − ILS)
(In the computations above it is worth to notice that h1(p
∗∗, 1) = 0.)
Observe that both eigenvalues are positive (because 1−β+ β
1+p∗∗·m
< 1 the positive
sign of e2 is a consequence of inequality (5)), thus the state (p
∗∗, 1) is unstable.
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Appendix C
Proof of Claim 1. A steady state of a dynamical system is asymptotically stable if both
eigenvalues of its Jacobian matrix are negative.
Jacobian matrix for the state (0, q∗) has the following form
J(0, q∗) =
[
h1(0, q
∗) 0
∂f2
∂p
(0, q∗) ∂f2
∂q
(0, q∗)
]
and its eigenvalues are given by:
e1 = h1(0, q
∗) = (1− β) · (IA − INA)−
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (cA −A)
− q∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
e2 =
∂f2
∂q
(0, q∗) = (1− q∗) · h2(0, q
∗)− q∗ · h2(0, q
∗) + q∗ · (1− q∗) ·
∂h2
∂q
(0, q∗)
= q∗ · (1− q∗) · [β · (IHS − ILS)− cHS]
(In the computations above it is worth to notice that h2(0, q
∗) = 0.)
By inequality (5) we have that the second eigenvalue is negative, e2 < 0. Thus we
determine when e1 < 0:
e1 < 0⇔ (1− β) · (IA − INA)−
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (cA − A)
− q∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
< 0
⇔ A < cA +
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (1− β) · (IA − INA)
+ q∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
.
Jacobian matrix for the state (1, q∗∗) has the following form
J(1, q∗∗) =
[
−h1(1, q
∗∗) 0
∂f2
∂p
(1, q∗∗) ∂f2
∂q
(1, q∗∗)
]
and it has eigenvalues:
e1 = −h1(1, q
∗∗) =
β
1 +m
(ILS −m ·A− IA) + (cA − A)− (IA − INA)
+ q∗∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− IE
)
e2 =
∂f2
∂q
(1, q∗∗) = (1− q∗∗) · h2(1, q
∗∗)− q∗∗ · h2(1, q
∗∗) + q∗∗ · (1− q∗∗) ·
∂h2
∂q
(1, q∗∗)
= q∗∗ · (1− q∗∗) ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− cHS
)
.
(In the computations above it is worth to notice that h2(1, q
∗∗) = 0.)
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By inequality (5) we have that the second eigenvalue is negative, e2 < 0. Therefore
we determine when when the first eigenvalue is negative:
e1 < 0⇔
β
1 +m
(ILS −m · A− IA) + (cA − A)− (IA − INA)
+ q∗∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− IE
)
< 0
⇐⇒ A >
1(
1 + m
1+m
β
) [cA + β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (IA − INA)
+ q∗∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− IE
)]
.
Proof of Corollary 3. For proving that A∗∗ < A∗ it is enough to show that
(
because
1
(1+ m1+mβ)
< 1
)
cA +
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (1− β) · (IA − INA) + q
∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
> cA +
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (IA − INA) + q
∗∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− IE
)
.
The last inequality reduces to the following one
β · (IA − INA) + IE · (q
∗∗ − (1− β) · q∗) +
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS) · (q
∗ − q∗∗) > 0. (19)
Observe that β · (IA − INA) > 0 and by (13) we have that
β
1+m
(IHS − ILS) · (q
∗ − q∗∗) > 0.
Thus for proving (19) it is sufficient to show that (q∗∗ − (1 − β) · q∗) > 0. By using (4)
and (12) we have that
q∗∗ > (1− β) · q∗ ⇐⇒
(1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
cHS −
β
1+m
· (IHS − ILS)
>
(1− β)2 · (IHS − ILS)
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
.
By (5) we know that in the last inequality both denominators are positive. Thus the last
inequality is equivalent to
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS) > (1− β) ·
(
cHS −
β
1 +m
· (IHS − ILS)
)
,
which reduces to
cHS −
β +m
1 +m
(IHS − ILS) > 0. (20)
Because β+m
1+m
< 1 we obtain by (5) that the inequality (20) holds true.
For the proof that A∗ < cA observe that this inequality is equivalent to
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (1− β) · (IA − INA) + q
∗
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
< 0.
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In order to show that the last inequality holds true observe that, by using (8) and because
q∗ < 1, we can estimate its left-hand-side:
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (1− β) · (IA − INA) + q
∗
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
<
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− (1− β) · (IA − INA) +
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
=
β
1 +m
(IHS − IA)− (1− β) · (IA + IE − INA). (21)
Finally notice that the expression in (21) is negative by (10).
Proof of Lemma 1. The solutions of the equations uA(p, q) = uNA(p, q) and uHS(p, q) =
uLS(p, q) with respect to variable q are respectively:
q =
β
1+m
(ILS − p ·m · A− IA) + (cA − A)− (1− β + β · p) · (IA − INA)
(1− β + β · p) · IE −
β
1+m
(IHS − ILS)
, (22)
and
q =
(1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
cHS −
β
1+p·m
(IHS − ILS)
. (23)
By equating the right-hand-sides of (22) and (23) and after rearranging we obtain the
following equation:
a · p2 + b · p+ c = 0,
where
a = β ·m ·
[
(1− β) · (IHS − ILS) · IE + cHS ·
(
IA − INA +
m
1 +m
A
)]
,
b = β · (1− β) · (IHS − ILS) · IE
+ β ·
(
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
·
(
IA − INA +
m
1 +m
A
)
− (1− β) ·m · (IHS − ILS) ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
−m · cHS ·
(
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA) + (cA − A)− (1− β) · (IA − INA)
)
,
c =
(
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
·
(
(1− β) · (IA − INA)−
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− cA + A
)
− (1− β) · (IHS − ILS) ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
.
We denote by (p1, q1), (p2, q2) the solutions of the system of equations (I). Without loss
of generality we can assume that p1 6 p2. Then by the Vieta’s formulas we have that
p1 · p2 =
c
a
,
p1 + p2 = −
b
a
.
(24)
It is evident that a > 0. Let us determine the sings of b and c. For this task we treat b
and c as functions of the parameter A.
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We first determine the sign of c(·). By (5) we have that c′(A) = cHS−β ·(IHS−ILS) > 0.
The last inequality implies that the function c(·) is strictly increasing. Moreover
c(A∗) =
(
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
·
(
(1− β) · (IA − INA)−
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− cA + A
∗
)
− (1− β) · (IHS − ILS) ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
= q∗ ·
(
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
− (1− β) · (IHS − ILS) ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
=
(
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
·
[
q∗ −
(1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
]
= 0
Thus
c(A) < 0 for A < A∗
c(A) = 0 for A = A∗
c(A) > 0 for A > A∗
(25)
We now determine the sign of b(·). By (5) we have that b′(A) = β·m
1+m
(
cHS − β · (IHS −
ILS)
)
+m · cHS > 0. Thus function b(·) is strictly increasing. Moreover
b(A∗) = β · (1− β) · (IHS − ILS) · IE
+ β ·
(
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
·
(
IA − INA +
m
1 +m
A∗
)
− (1− β) ·m · (IHS − ILS) ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
+m · cHS · q
∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
= β · (1− β) · (IHS − ILS) · IE
+ β ·
(
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
·
(
IA − INA +
m
1 +m
A∗
)
+m ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
·
(
cHS · q
∗ − (1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
)
= β · (1− β) · (IHS − ILS) · IE
+ β ·
(
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
·
(
IA − INA +
m
1 +m
A∗
)
+m · β · (1− β) ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
(IHS − ILS)
2
cHS − β · (IHS − ILS)
.
(26)
(27)
(28)
Now the expression (26) is positive, by (5) the expression (27) is positive and by the
inequality (8) the expression (28) is positive. Therefore
b(A) > 0 for A > A∗. (29)
By using (24), (25) and (29) we derive the following conclusions:
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Case A < A∗. Because p1 · p2 < 0 we have that p1 < 0 and p2 > 0. Because p1 < 0 we
obtain that (p1, q1) /∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1].
Case A = A∗. Because p1 · p2 = 0 and p1 + p2 < 0 we have that p1 < 0 and p2 = 0.
Because p1 < 0 we obtain that (p1, q1) /∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1].
Case A > A∗. Because p1 · p2 > 0 and p1 + p2 < 0 we have that p1 < 0 and p2 < 0.
Therefore (p1, q1) /∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] and (p2, q2) /∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1].
Proof of Corollary 4. The proof of thesis 1. is straightforward. Indeed, we have that
q∗∗ 6 q 6 q∗ if and only if
(1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
cHS −
β
1+m
(ILS − ILS)
6
(1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
cHS −
β
1+p·m
(ILS − ILS)
6
(1− β) · (IHS − ILS)
cHS − β · (ILS − ILS)
⇐⇒ cHS −
β
1 +m
(ILS − ILS) > cHS −
β
1 + p ·m
(ILS − ILS) > cHS − β · (ILS − ILS)
⇐⇒
β
1 +m
(ILS − ILS) 6
β
1 + p ·m
(ILS − ILS) 6 β · (ILS − ILS)
⇐⇒ 1 +m > 1 + p ·m > 1⇐⇒ 1 > p > 0.
For the proof of thesis 2. we compute the Jacobian matrix in the state (p, q) (we use
the notation from Appendix B)
J(p, q) =
[
∂f1
∂p
(p, q) ∂f1
∂q
(p, q)
∂f2
∂p
(p, q) ∂f2
∂q
(p, q)
]
,
where (notice that h1(p, q) = h2(p, q) = 0):
∂f1
∂p
(p, q) = p · (1− p)
∂h1
∂p
(p, q) = p · (1− p)
(
β · (IA − INA) + β · q · IE +
m
1 +m
β · A
)
,
∂f1
∂q
(p, q) = p · (1− p)
∂h1
∂q
(p, q) = p · (1− p)
(
(1− β) · IE + β · p · IE −
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)
)
,
∂f2
∂p
(p, q) = q · (1− q)
∂h2
∂p
(p, q) = q · (1− q)
(
−1
(1 + p ·m)2
· β ·m · q · (IHS − ILS)
)
,
∂f2
∂q
(p, q) = q · (1− q)
∂h2
∂q
(p, q) = q · (1− q)
(
β
1 + p ·m
(IHS − ILS)− cHS
)
.
Now
det(J(p, q)) = p · (1− p) · q · (1− q) ·
[
∂h1
∂p
(p, q) ·
∂h2
∂q
(p, q)−
∂h1
∂q
(p, q) ·
∂h2
∂p
(p, q)
]
.
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Let us rewrite the expression in the square brackets above
∂h1
∂p
(p, q) ·
∂h2
∂q
(p, q)−
∂h1
∂q
(p, q) ·
∂h2
∂p
(p, q)
=
(
β · (IA − INA) +
m
1 +m
β · A
)
·
(
β
1 + p ·m
(IHS − ILS)− cHS
)
+
(
(1− β) · IE −
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)
)
β ·m · q
(1 + p ·m)2
(IHS − ILS)
+ β · q · IE ·
(
β
1 + p ·m
(IHS − ILS)− cHS
)
+
β2 ·m · p · q
(1 + p ·m)2
(IHS − ILS) · IE
=
(
β · (IA − INA) +
m
1 +m
β · A
)
·
(
β
1 + p ·m
(IHS − ILS)− cHS
)
+
(
(1− β) · IE −
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)
)
β ·m · q
(1 + p ·m)2
(IHS − ILS)
+ β · q · IE ·
(
β
1 + p·m
1+p·m
1 + p ·m
(IHS − ILS)− cHS
)
(30)
(31)
(32)
By (5) we have that
(
β
1+p·m
(IHS − ILS)− cHS
)
< 0 and
(
β
1+
p·m
1+p·m
1+p·m
(IHS − ILS)− cHS
)
< 0,
thus the expressions (30) and (32) are negative. Moreover by (8) the expression in (31)
is negative. Therefore
det
(
J(p, q)
)
< 0. (33)
Let us denote by e1, e2 the eigenvalues of J(p, q). By (33) we have that e1 · e2 =
det(J(p, q) < 0. Consequently one eigenvalue is positive and the other eigenvalue is
negative. As a result the state (p, q) is unstable.
Appendix D
Proof of Claim 2. Because uHS(0, q
∗) = uLS(0, q
∗) and uHS(1, q
∗∗) = uLS(1, q
∗∗) we have
by (17) that
SWN(0, q
∗, 0) = N · uLS(0, q
∗)∣∣A=0
= N · [(1− β) · (ILS + q
∗ · IE)− β · q
∗ · (IHS − ILS)]
= N ·
[
q∗ ·
(
(1− β) · IE − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
+ (1− β) · ILS
]
,
and
SWN(1, q
∗∗, A∗) = N · uLS(1, q
∗∗)∣∣A=A∗
= N ·
[
(1− β) · (ILS + q
∗∗ · IE −m · A
∗)−
β · q∗∗
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)
]
= N ·
[
q∗∗ ·
(
(1− β) · IE −
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)
)
+ (1− β) · ILS
− (1− β) ·m · A∗
]
.
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Thus SWN (1, q
∗∗, A∗) > SWN(0, q
∗, 0) if and only if
q∗∗ ·
(
(1− β) · IE −
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)
)
− (1− β) ·m · A∗
> q∗ ·
(
(1− β) · IE − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
,
or equivalently
(1− β) ·m · A∗ < q∗∗ ·
(
(1− β) · IE −
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)
)
− q∗ ·
(
(1− β) · IE − β · (IHS − ILS)
)
.
By using (4) and (12) we simplify the last inequality to
(1− β) ·m · A∗ < q∗ · q∗∗ ·
β
1− β
·
m
1 +m
(cHS − (1− β) · IE) . (34)
Because A∗ = cA − cA (compare (14) with (16)) we obtain form (34) that
SWN (1, q
∗∗, A∗) > SWN(0, q
∗, 0)⇐⇒ cA < cA + q
∗ · q∗∗ ·
β · (cHS − (1− β) · IE)
(1 +m)(1 − β)2
.
Proof of Corollary 5. We have that
SWM(0, q
∗, 0) = M · uNA(0, q
∗)∣∣A=0 = M · (1− β) · INA
and that
SWM(1, q
∗∗, A∗) = M · uA(1, q
∗∗)∣∣A=A∗
= M ·
[(
1 +
m
1 +m
β
)
· A∗ + (1− β) · IA −
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− cA
−q∗∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)]
.
Thus SWM(1, q
∗∗, A∗) > SWM(0, q
∗, 0) if and only if(
1 +
m
1 +m
β
)
· A∗ + (1− β) · (IA − INA)−
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− cA
− q∗∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
> 0.
(35)
By using (14) we have that
(1− β) · (IA− INA)−
β
1 +m
(ILS − IA)− cA = q
∗ ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
−A∗
By including this fact in (35) we obtain the following inequality
m
1 +m
β · A∗ > (q∗∗ − q∗) ·
(
β
1 +m
(IHS − ILS)− (1− β) · IE
)
.
Now the last inequality is satisfied because its left-hand-side is positive (in Section 4 we
assume that A∗ > 0) and the right-hand-side is negative by (8) and (13).
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